D
URING the last quarter of the nineteenth century foreign textile industries developed rapidly enough to begin to overhaul the position of the United Kingdom as the sole largescale world producer of cotton textiles,1 and this overall increase in the volume of world cotton textiles production, without a corresponding expansion in international trade for cotton goods, 1 My Ph.D. Thesis, " The Lancashire Cotton Industry and the Great Depression 1873-1896" (Birmingham, 1954) , has plotted in much closer detail the rapid development of foreign cotton textile industries and the increased competitive world-market conditions for the sale of cotton textiles which were common to the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Suffice it now to summarize briefly the changes in the distribution of world mill spindleage during the second half of the nineteenth century in the It is the purpose of this article to discover whether or not the changing position of the Lancashire cotton industry, vis-&-vis world cotton textile trade during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, produced any significant alteration in the prevailing *' Manchester" support for free trading principles and whether, during the seventies or later in the century, the Lancashire industry began to call upon Her Majesty's Government for greater assistance in dealing with those countries where imports of Lancashire cottons were being affected adversely by newly imposed Protectionist legislation.
Fortunately for these purposes a cross-section of the Lancashire cotton business community merchants, shippers, spinners, and manufacturers among others attended the meetings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, an especially powerful cotton trade organization for most of the nineteenth century, intended to concern itself only with matters of trade affecting the interests of the United Kingdom cotton industry. It is in the records of these private Chamber meetings that we are enabled to discover what exactly the Lancashire businessmen officially proposed in order to maintain their own trading position against the rising foreign textile competitors.2 1 Whereas in the first half of the nineteenth century some 55 per cent, of world cotton goods production entered into international trade, in 1884 the proportion had declined to little more than one-third. Furthermore, from 1880 until 1913 World production of cotton goods increased two and one half times, whilst World trade in cottons doubled ; the proportion of production destined for export fell from one-third to 28 per cent, of the total. (See R. Robson, " The Location and Development of the Cotton Industry ", Journal of Industrial Economics, April, 1953.) 2 It is not the intention here to construct from the Chamber Minutes a full history of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce during the last quarter of the nineteenth century; as the activities of the Chamber were multifarious, we shall be concerned only with those which bear directly upon the theme outlined.
I
The demands for tariff reform and a return to protection made by several sections of the United Kingdom business community after 1870 show a definite time relationship with the arrival of increased competitive conditions for the sale of British goods in home and foreign markets.
There had always been some sectional criticism of the working of free trade during the mid-nineteenth century, but mainly by Conservatives who were intent upon sniping at the Liberals and not unduly serious about making definite proposals to change the fiscal system; the great forward movement of protection in the United Kingdom did not start until the late seventies, when, for some sections of the business community at least, free trade could be said to be losing its former charm. The slowing down in the momentum of increase of United Kingdom exports measured either by value or by quantitative terms whilst imports continued to increase, was the chief cause of alarm; it was argued by the tariff reformers J that foreign protectionist legislation was beginning to deprive British export industries of some share in the demand for manufactured goods from overseas markets, whilst foreign merchants and manufacturers were permitted to sell freely in the United Kingdom or Colonial markets.2
But the agitation intended to promote the case for tariff protection was neither haphazard nor unorganized; in 1881 a National Fair Trade League was founded in London, and other branches soon appeared in all parts of the United Kingdom.3 Their written aims were " to agitate for such fiscal readjustments as shall prevent the products of foreign states, which refuse to 1 See the whole set of Reports from different British industries collected in the Tariff Commission, 1905. 2 According to W. Schlote, British Overseas Trade 1760 until 1938 (translated by W. H. Chaloner and W. 0. Henderson, 1952 , pp. 66-8, the net imports of finished manufactured goods as a percentage of total United Kingdom imports rose from 6-9 per cent, in 1853-9 to 167 per cent, in 1890-9.
8 Other Fair Trade Associations beside the National Fair Trade League are mentioned in B. H. Brown, The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain, 1881 -(1943 deal with Great Britain in fair trade, from unduly competing with the products of home labour ". All seemed prepared for the renewal of the former battles fought in the first half of the century between the supporters of free trade and the protectionists. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce could not avoid open combat with the Fair Traders, for after all it was in some of the earliest meetings of the Chamber during the eighteen-twenties that many of the arguments about free trade had first been discussed ; it was in these same meetings, too, that the difficulties of ever implementing a free trade fiscal policy were thrashed out in private and in detail long before Manchester gave its powerful support to the commercial reforms implemented nationally in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Manchester, therefore, had a personal as well as a vested business interest in seeking to maintain free trade at home and an international free trading system after 1870. Lancashire cottons were still for the most part the cheapest in the world and, given free market conditions, they could compete effectively with those of any other nation ; consequently, the Manchester Chamber directors, representing the rank and file cotton businessmen, sought continuously to maintain free international trading and to frustrate all attempts by foreign states to adopt tariff protection. In Europe, where some governments had never accepted free trade in all commodities, the Chamber directors sought a continuous reduction in the duties which remained, and from time to time vigorously protested against proposed increases.
It was to be expected, therefore, that the Manchester Chamber directors would be particularly attentive to the details of all tariff bargaining taking place after 1870 in which the United Kingdom was involved. In 1870, for instance, the Manchester Chamber directors urged the British and Spanish Governments to seek the abolition of the " highly prohibitive duties which exist as obstacles to any extension of trade with the Peninsula ". In Manchester's opinion, " the people of both countries [i.e. Spain and Portugal] are favourable to a reduction of duties and if the means for free commercial intercourse were introduced they would be appreciated and lead to a full and legitimate expansion of trade with those countries." 1
No tangible results were achieved by the Manchester protests and the duties remained in force. Moreover, in 1877 the Spanish and Portuguese Governments each contemplated increasing the level of their tariff duties, and the Manchester Chamber again petitioned Britain's Foreign Secretary to act on behalf of Manchester merchants trading in the Spanish Peninsula by opposing " any increased hindrance in the way of trading intercourse with Spain and Portugal ". 2 But once again the two foreign governments paid no attention to British protests and both proceeded to increase their tariffs.
The complete list of Manchester protests tendered by way of the British Foreign Secretary to foreign governments against retained tariff impositions or proposed departures from free trading principles would be too long to detail; they included protests to the Italian Government against the retention of tariffs on bleached yarns, against the increase in Greek and Turkish tariffs in November 1878 and again in December 1884, against the increased Russian, Italian, and Austrian tariffs in July 1887, and representation to the British Colonial Office in February 1891 in protest against the imposition of a 10 per cent, duty upon cotton textile imports into the Gold Coast.
It was not always a one-sided delivery of official views between the Manchester Chamber and the British Government, for very often the Government themselves made the initial approach to the Chamber ; in fact, at the opening of the final quarter of the nineteenth century there still existed very close co-operation and a community of interest in all matters between the Government of the day and the Lancashire cotton industry.
In 1871, when the French Government were desirous of scrapping the Cobden-Chevalier Commercial Treaty and increasing certain import duties, the Gladstone Government despatched the text of the French proposals to the Directors of the Manchester Chamber *' requesting a detailed Memorandum (i) By a 20 per cent, increase of duty on raw cotton, (ii) By a 15 per cent, increase of duty on silk, (iii) By a 10 per cent, increase of duty on flax, (iv) By a 15 per cent, increase of duty on linen, (v) An increase would also be proposed on the duties for the medium and fine cotton yarns from 3 to 5 per cent.
In reply the Manchester Chamber condemned the French decision, for it *' would have the effect of destroying the small trade at present existing and the present duty of 15 per cent, was already prohibitory of the import to France of cotton manufactures in general. That, whilst the fullest sympathy was manifested for France under her present difficulties, it was the general belief that her only hope lay in the direction of following the free trade example of this country."1 It was made clear to a Chamber deputation which visited the Board of Trade that, " the French, under Article 9 of the 1860 Commercial Treaty had the power to impose higher duties on the imports of foreign manufactures in case they should at the same time impose higher duties on the importation of raw materials for their own internal consumption the expressed condition being that the increased duties shall in no degree be protective." Sir Louis Mallet, one of the leading Board of Trade officials, told the deputation that the " anticipations which were once entertained as to the growth of free trade principles in France, have certainly not been realized; in France great ignorance prevails and economic laws are almost unknown. There is no public opinion or the educating influence of open and public discussion which in this Country has so materially assisted in the dissemination of sound views."2 Mr. Mason, who led the Chamber deputation, reminded Sir Louis Mallet of the sudden growth of the French cotton industry competing with Lancashire in the French home market, and he complained that " the duties imposed upon certain kinds of our yarn and manufactures under the Treaty were made owing chiefly to the improvements adopted by the French in the management of their cotton trade ".
The majority of Chamber members were, in fact, strongly opposed to these French protectionist moves and they expressed their feelings in two forthright Resolutions despatched to the Gladstone Cabinet in October 1871. The first was directed at the French Government and " lamented that the French people are required to bear heavy taxation for the payment of interest on their great National Debt, and deeply regrets that with the beneficent results of the free trade policy of this country before their eyes, the French Government should think it necessary or desirable to fetter the interchange of Commerce with other nations " ; the second was directed at the French people, but it contained a message for all trading nations, since it expressed the Manchester free traders' " emphatic condemnation of a policy having for its object the imposition of taxes for purely protectionist ends a policy which is inimical to the true interests of this country ". 1
These outspoken Manchester protests secured a brief postponement of the first French moves toward protection, but only twelve months later the details of a new Anglo-French Trade Agreement were again under discussion. Once the Treaty proposals were published, the Manchester Chamber joined along with the Bradford, Macclesfield and many other trade associations from the northern industrial towns in protest against them.8 For example, the clause enabling the French " to have power to increase the duties on the products of any branch of industry by merely giving six months' notice and having the consent of the other Treaty signatories ", was described by the Manchester Chamber as " mischievous ".8
But these moves to increase tariff duties made by the French Republican Government were inspired by political as well as economic considerations. Concerted opposition to any increase in French tariff duties led to an announcement by the French Government in 1874 that " they were content to retain the existing commercial arrangements without any move towards Protection ". That contentment, however, was only temporary, and in 1880 commercial negotiations were re-opened between the Governments of the two countries after the French had intimated that they intended increasing the duties on several classes of British imports. Cotton textiles were included in this category and the Manchester Chamber directors reiterated their old protests 2 to the British and French Governments:
In the general tariff now under notice, instead of a reduction of duties, we find a very marked increase, and further, a change from the principle of ad valorem to that of a specific assessment so adroitly arranged by a grouping of classes, as practically to put an end to the possibility of the textile fabrics hitherto sent to France being thenceforth imported into that country. . . . Having regard to the distinctly protective nature of this new general tariff and to the little value which the French Government evidently places upon friendly relations with Great Britain or upon any further development of trade between the two countries, it is expedient to recommend to Her Majesty's Government the total and immediate abandonment of all Treaty negotiations with the French Government.
Negotiations on the possibility of changing tariff levels by agreement between the two countries were terminated forthwith.1 They were re-opened, however, a few months later and in the following year the two countries were enabled to settle their commercial differences by the French Government granting the United Kingdom " most favoured nation " rights for the sale of British goods inside France.
Ten years later, in 1892, a new French tariff was evolved which fixed maximum and minimum scales of duty. In most cases it meant an increase in the old duties especially for cotton textiles. In practice the new French tariffs were almost prohibitive and several British firms only found it possible to penetrate the French market by setting up mills in that country ; indeed, one British textile firm invested so much of its capital in French spinning mills that its " French business had become more important than that in England ".2
Without doubt, increased French tariffs, imposed contemporaneously with the growth of the " infant" French cotton industry, helped to accelerate the decline in Lancashire's cotton textile exports to France ;3 moreover, the fears expressed by the Manchester Chamber directors in the seventies, that increased tariffs whether imposed by the French or other European governments along with advancing industrialization, would do 
II
Of all the countries supplied with British cotton goods, the importance of those in the Far East was paramount throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1876, for instance, 32*6 per cent, of all cotton yarns and 54*3 per cent, of all cotton cloths exported from the United Kingdom were sold in the Indian, Chinese and Japanese markets ; however, Lancashire's position was by no means secure, for this was also the period of early growth among the infant Asiatic textile industries intending to sell goods in markets long dominated by Lancashire. 2 In these conditions it was only to be expected that Far Eastern trade problems would monopolize much of the attention of the different Lancashire cotton trade associations and that of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in particular, for in the latter body were many of the businessmen who handled Lancashire's Far Eastern trade. Their interest in the Far East was extended to include anything which bore even the faintest relationship to the capacity of That your Memorialists, having regard to the vast population of British India and the capabilities of the country for an increased consumption of European goods, or on the other hand, the natural capabilities of the soil of India for the supply of the wants of the country, view the result as disproportionate and unsatisfactory, leaving a wide field for further developments. And your Memorialists have still to deplore the delay in the adoption of measures for the promotion of many agricultural improvements which would tend to increase the quantity and improve the quality of raw cotton and relieve the cotton trade from its dependence on America as its principal source of supply of the raw material.2
But despite the obvious goodwill toward India displayed in the above Memorial, Lancashire business interests were often inconsiderate of Indian economic progress, and, although at all times Lancashire took a fervent interest in Indian affairs, it was not always benevolent. Consider, by way of example, the long enduring debate which took place between the Manchester Chamber and the India Office regarding the Indian import duties.
Before the Indian Mutiny the duties upon cotton manufactures imported into India had varied from 3 to 5 per cent., the precise levy depending upon the grade and type of cloth. Increased and improved Government services in India after the Mutiny were responsible for an appreciable rise in Indian Government expenditure; faced with the problem of meeting this expenditure, the India Office agreed to increase the level of duties imposed upon certain classes of cotton imports. Lancashire trade associations protested immediately and vigorously against the increased impositions, arguing that the duties formed a convenient protective shield for the growth of the Indian cotton industry. In fact, the Indian cotton industry grew rapidly through the sixties, with the result that Manchester merchants became alarmed at the increasingly competitive trading conditions for the sale of cotton goods in the Indian home market. In a Memorial despatched to the Prime Minister 'RMCC. 27 March 1872.
2 Later in the century and in another connection, one Lancashire Chamber director made the point that: " the true interests of India He in the development of the Continent's vast agricultural resources, because the Indian population were unsuited to factory production ". (J. C. Fielden, The dangers surrounding the cotton trade, 1889). during 1874, the Chamber Directors described the Indian duties as " absolutely prohibitory to the trade in yarn and cloth of the coarse and low priced sorts " ; furthermore, " the levying of duties when their effect is to afford protection to one portion of Her Majesty's subjects in India, to the disadvantage of another portion in England with whom they are brought into competition in trade, is inconsistent with the commercial policy of this country 'V After the receipt of this Memorial a Special Tariff Committee was appointed to examine the effects of the import duties upon Lancashire's trade with India. In their report the committee argued that, since Lancashire and Bombay mills produced entirely different types of cotton goods and were not really in close competition, there should be no alteration in the prevailing duties. Lancashire mills, so the committee explained, now sold to India more of the medium to fine goods, which could not yet be manufactured on a remunerative basis by the Indian textile producers, who concerned themselves predominantly with the manufacture of coarse goods.
Market evidence contradicts these findings ; while it would have been true to say that few British cotton goods of the coarsest varieties were being sold in India, the changeover from Lancashire supplying India with the finer cottons rather than the more coarse varieties was a gradual process and one which began and continued throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Certainly, in the seventies and for several years after, intense competition between British and Indian cotton goods' producers took place " at the margin of the coarse and medium quality goods trade " that is, trading competition was virtually non-existent among the very coarse and the very fine cottons, but in the less coarse and medium grades competition between the two sets of manufacturers was extremely keen. 2
Indian cotton manufacturers experimented many times before the end of the century with the bulk production of medium 'RM.CC. 28 January 1874. 2 The bulk of Indian spun cotton yarn was of the very coarse variety counts 6, 10 and 20; few British firms sold the 6 or 10 counts, but the trade in 20s remained important despite the increasing weight of Indian competition. (See The Report of Trade with British India and British Possessions, 1879.) and finer cottons, but two technical drawbacks withheld a successful conclusion to their efforts. Firstly, the skill and technical experience required to spin or weave the finer goods was not as readily available among Indian operatives as it was in Lancashire, and secondly, it proved impossible to manufacture the finer goods from the poor quality locally-grown Indian raw cotton. The Indian millowners tried desperately to remedy this second deficiency by the importation of small quantities of the better quality American or Egyptian raw cotton, but an additional 5 per cent, duty was levied by the India Office upon all supplies of raw cotton imported into India for cotton yarn spinning and, by importing these alternative supplies, the Indian cotton spinners surrendered their cost advantage to the Lancashire competitors.
On each occasion when the Indian Tariff Acts came under review the Manchester Chamber would reiterate their reasons for the immediate remission of the duties imposed upon imported cotton manufactures. In effect, since the prices of British cotton goods of equivalent quality were cheaper or as cheap as those produced in Indian mills, the Lancashire trade associations were seeking a return to free trade in the Indian market in order to weight the balance of consumption in favour of Lancashire goods. During April 1876 1 the following four-point Memorandum was submitted to the India Office prior to the review of the Duties for that year :
1 . That the Duties now levied are up to a certain point that is on low yams and piece goods not only protective, but prohibitive and contrary to the commercial policy of Great Britain. 2. That in the interests of the Indian consumer they ought to be abolished as they exclude him from the advantage of competition and artificially raise the price of his clothing for the benefit of the Indian millowner. 3. The following affords an example of the unfair incidence of the Duty : a mill in Lancashire containing 700 looms will produce £2,000 worth of cloth weekly, the duty to be paid on this amount at 5 per cent, is £100 per week or a tax of £5,200 per annum on the Lancashire manufacturer who exports to India. 4. It is well known and admitted that the trade to India has of late years been carried on at a mere margin of profit ; and in some cases a loss has been all but inevitable.
.M.CC. 19 April 1876.
Eventually, in the spring of 1878, the India Office agreed to exempt from duty the coarser varieties of cotton goods, which included unbleached T-cloths and coarse twist yarns below 20s count.1 In the latter case it was argued officially, " that even if the finer British yarns were all exempted from duty, it would not lead to any noticeable increase in exports to India since there was little fine cloth weaving and, therefore, little demand in this part of the Empire ".2
Lancashire manufacturers immediately expressed their deep disappointment with the Government's decision to exempt so few goods from duty, and the Manchester Chamber continued its campaign to convince the India Office of the need for total abolition. Fierce controversy was revived when the Secretary of State for India proposed an increase in the Indian import duties during 1894. Announcing this in the House of Commons, Mr. Fowler, the newly appointed Secretary of State for India, declared, " that the embarrassed condition of the finances and the certainty that the accounts of the present year and the estimates of the year 1894-5 showed a heavy deficit, placed the Government under the necessity of reducing expenditure wherever possible and of increasing income ". The tariff changes took the form of a five per cent, increase in duty upon all imported piece goods and on all medium and fine spun cotton yarns over 20s count.3 8 For the immediate effects of the increased duties upon the export pattern of British cotton goods to India, see E. Helm, " The Indian Import Duties " (Economic Journal, 18%).
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Lancashire trade associations again protested that the new tariff impositions were " contrary to the existing commercial policy of the United Kingdom and to the spirit of the earlier House of Commons resolutions on the necessity of freer AngloIndian trading conditions ".
Twelve months before the increases were announced Lord Kimberley, who was then Secretary of State for India, had visited the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce and in his address to that body had declared : " there remains only one considerable source of revenue for India and I mention it at once with a thrill of horror the idea of import duties. I merely mention it for the purpose of dismissing it. The industry of Lancashire and Yorkshire is prosecuted with great energy and it is one of which we are most proud and one which we ought in every conceivable manner to support and encourage."1 Lord Kimberley, however, left the India Office early in March 1894, but the contents of his Blackburn speech were well remembered by many Lancashire businessmen. One of them was James Whittaker, a cotton cloth manufacturer and a director of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce, who decided to campaign personally against the recent changes in the Indian import duties.2 It was not long, however, before he was supported in his campaign by other cotton employers and by all the more important cotton union leaders.3
In May 1895 Whittaker led an Employers-Union deputation to the India Office 4 and during the interview with the Secretary of State for India he enquired whether, in the light of Lord 1 A full report of Lord Kimberley *s speech is printed in the Blackburn Times, 22 June 1893. * Whittaker's views are conveniently summarized in a pamphlet he himself wrote, The Re-imposition of the Indian import duties on cotton goods and yarn.
"The cotton unions condemned the action of the House of Commons in supporting the proposal to increase the Indian import duties ; they condemned particularly " two Lancashire M.P.'s who voted for the increase even though they did not understand the matter ". (Cotton Factory Times, 8 March 1895.) * In the nineties British workers and their representatives still identified their well-being with that of the trade in which they were engaged ; a worker employed by a firm whose business was affected by foreign competition was prepared to join with the employers in making joint protests for Government remedial action of one kind or another.
Kimberley's Blackburn speech, the increase in the import duties was altogether so vital for Indian financial solvency ? He went on: " who are the people in India at present urging the imposition of these indirect taxes ; in our opinion they are the millowners, small-scale capitalists and civil servants who wish to avoid any increase in direct taxation and were most indignant when cotton goods were not included among the increased import duties announced for 1892. They were, therefore, included in the new 1894 tariff list. The interest of the cotton spinner and the manufacturer in the United Kingdom is identified with the interest of the Indian consumer, and an injury cannot be done to the latter without it being reflected upon the former. Whatever contention there may be as to who pays this duty, one thing is certain and that is that the sum of 3,150,000 rupees per annum will be extracted from our exports of yarn and cloth to India. Whether this large sum is paid by the Indian consumer or by the British producer, the result must be alike, injurious to us."1 Whittaker ended his statement with these well-chosen words : " to the development of the cotton industry in India by fair and legitimate means, Lancashire does not and never has objected. We have supplied India with our most improved machinery and our best workmen; but Lancashire does object to the fostering and protection of a competing industry in our Dependency at the expense of the same industry in the Mother Country. We have imposed order and peace in India and have pledged the credit of England in order to develop the resources of the country, and consequently, we have the right to expect that our trading relations with that country should be unimpeded."
Despite these many enquiries and contentions Fowler remained adamantly convinced that the import duties were a 1 The increased duties weighed more heavily upon coarse cloth imports than the coarse yarn imports, and Elijah Helm, then Secretary of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, writing in the Economic Journal (op. cit. (1896)), claimed that " cloth manufacturers, particularly in Blackburn, were compelled to halt their machinery temporarily during 1895 and to seek alternative markets, whilst workpeople were deprived of their earnings ". 524 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY necessity and organized agitation for their remission was continued by Lancashire trade associations into the early years of the twentieth century. But despite all the protests the duties remained. Earlier in the century there had been a time when the British Government would have reacted speedily to any change in Lancashire's trade opinions. Times were changing, however, and although Lancashire cotton still remained one of the most powerful industrial and political pressure groups within the United Kingdom, that power was becoming relatively less important than it had been.
Ill
Whilst protesting to the British Government against what they regarded as preferential tariff treatment for the Indian cotton industry, the Lancashire business community also recognized other factors which had assisted the Indian industry in their competition with Lancashire goods the proximity of Indian mills to a vast home market capable of consuming an untold quantity of cotton goods, proximity to cheap supplies of raw cotton, adequate availability of low wage labour, and, finally, the competitive cost advantage secured from a currency based upon silver that had been recently depreciated relative to the value of gold. It was upon the last factor that members of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce concentrated their attention during the last few years of the nineteenth century, for it appeared to them that neither the cotton industry nor the British Government could do much to even up the advantages endowed by nature upon the Indian cotton industry, but they did have it within their power to remove the competitive cost advantage secured by the Indian millowners from the depreciation of silver, by establishing a bimetallic currency of gold and silver for the United Kingdom.
The advantages of bimetallism for the United Kingdom had first been argued before the Chamber directors during April 1 879, 1 but the majority of those present still believed " that gold as a standard and unlimited legal tender, with subordinate and .MC-C. April 1879.
limited coinage of silver and copper as token money, is best adapted to the necessities and convenience of the country and should therefore be continued ".
As Asiatic low cost competition in cotton textiles became more intensive after 1880, the Lancashire cotton community took a keener interest in currency matters and the Manchester Chamber supported the appointment of a Royal Commission in July 1885 charged " to enquire into the present relative position of Gold and Silver in their uses as money throughout the World 'V But even though a majority of the Chamber members were prepared to support the Commission's appointment, the same majority remained undecided whether or not the depreciation of silver values had proved of any greater significance in favourably assisting the Indian cotton industry than other factors. Similarly, there were many cotton trade businessmen both inside and outside the Manchester Chamber who still opposed the arguments of the bimetallists.
Day by day, however, Lancashire support for the bimetallists increased, and there are two credible explanations of the popular dissemination of the involved financial arguments freely used by their supporters. First, the Manchester Guardian became the mouthpiece of the bimetallist cause and the newspaper editorials made great popular play with the involved bimetallist arguments ; further, in 1886, a Bi-metallic League was founded by those who desired the implementation of a bi-metallic currency for the United Kingdom,2 and the intentions of the League were to " disseminate financial information, to organize deliberate agitation and to urge upon the British Government the necessity of co-operating with other leading Nations for the establishment by International Agreement of the free coinage of gold and silver at a fixed rate ".
Most of its leading members were Lancashire businessmen and it assembled its headquarters in Manchester. Sir William Houldsworth Member of Parliament, Chamber Director, free 'PJVUX. 28 July 1885.
trader and important cotton manufacturer was one of the more prominent bimetallists who also had the time to perambulate around the northern industrial towns urging " that there should be a common standard and measure of value among all the commercial nations of the World, so that our industry may rest on a safe and stable basis undisturbed by the fluctuations and dislocations which, under the present system of disunited currencies, are inevitable **.1
Inside the Manchester Chamber a coterie of members all supporters of the Bi-Metallic League grouped themselves around Sir William Houldsworth and purposely utilized every opportunity to impress their monetary opinions upon other members. Since the major proportion of British cotton goods were sold to silver-using Asiatic communities, the bimetallists were particularly concerned " that the ill effects of the currency system were restricting the Lancashire cotton industry from participating in the recent brisk business activity which other British industries are now enjoying ". In their opinion " it was the low price of silver which gave the silver using textile producing countries an undue advantage in competition on the World market, and at the same time worked as a high tariff wall for the protection of their own home industry ".2
One of the peculiarities of the bimetallist controversy, as indeed of the Manchester demands for the increased economic development of the Indian and Colonial Territories, was that the agitation increased in intensity during periods of depressed trade. In October 1892, for instance, when trading conditions in the Lancashire industry were worsening, a full scale debate lasting more than three days was organized by the Chamber after fortyeight member-firms had signed a requisition notice calling a Special Meeting of all interested Lancashire businessmen and 1 Taken from Sir William Houldsworth's speech at Blackburn on 25 October 1889. Blackburn businessmen remained firmly anti-bimetallist despite the fact that most of the cloth woven in Blackburn mills eventually found its way into the silver using Asiatic markets. For a recital of the Blackburn Chamber opinions on the bimetallist problem see Economist Commercial Review, Monthly Trade Supplement, July 1893.
2 From a speech delivered by J. C. Fielden in the Manchester Chamber; P.M,C.C, 1 October 1888. cotton union officials 1 to discuss and approve a Resolution seeking " to re-open the World's mints to the unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver ". There were a great many speeches made during the three day discussions until Mr. Beith, a Manchester Chamber Director moved the closure. In doing so he argued that the decision made in 1873, to maintain gold as the sole measure of international trading value, had resulted in violent fluctuations on the Eastern Exchanges and had placed a heavy strain upon gold supplies which in his opinion had helped to accentuate the precipitous decline in World commodity prices. " In contrast to the present situation ", he went on, " the use of the gold and silver coinage together as one single measure of value for all countries of the World would remove those prevalent price depressions and their disastrous effects upon business might be ended." Despite the shaky monetary reasoning, the resolution was approved and forwarded to the Prime Minister, but, instead of " re-opening the World's mints to the unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver", the British Government decided in December 1893 to close the Indian mints, which at least for the time being dealt with the problem of fluctuating exchange rates so far as Lancashire's Indian and South East Asiatic export trade was concerned.
IV
The anxiety shared by most Lancashire cotton businessmen at the rapid growth of the Indian cotton industry particularly its spinning section and the loss of trade to Indian competitors in Asiatic markets, prompted the Manchester Chamber to form a Commission of Enquiry in October 1886 2 " for the purpose of 1 All the cotton unions were pro-bimetallist and one of the reasons why the Unions supported the Conservative Party rather than the Liberals at this period was because they believed that only a Conservative Government would reform the currency and stabilize the exchanges with the East. (See Schulz-Gaevernitz, Social Peace (1894), p. 168.) 2 P.M.C.C. 31 October 1886. During the inter-war years 1919-39 the growth of Japanese competition to Lancashire goods was followed by a suggestion to form a similar Commission for the purpose of examining the cost differentials of cotton textile production in Great Britain and Japan. (See B. Ellinger, " Lancashire Trade with China ", Manchester Statistical Society, 1927.) 34 528 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY examining and reporting to a special meeting of the Chamber as to the causes and circumstances which have enabled Bombay spinners to supersede those of Lancashire ". The form of the Enquiry was important; a calculation was to be made of the total costs involved in transporting and selling Indian and Lancashire cotton yarns in foreign markets. The costs of the previous year's working were to be taken as standard in both countries and the exchange rate was to be \7d. to the rupee. Circulars were distributed among Oldham and Bombay firms for information on raw material costs, yarn distribution costs, the cost of repairs, lighting, holding stores in fact, the full details of the mill cost structure in the two countries. In addition, witnesses were invited to deliver oral evidence before the Enquiry Committee sitting in Manchester. J. C. Fielden, who employed 2,000 workers in one of the biggest cotton spinning concerns in England, was one of those invited to give evidence.1 He believed that " wage costs for a 30,000 spindle mill, spinning coarse yarns in Lancashire, with 120 hands would be about '64d. per Ib. of yarn. The total cost would depend upon the raw cotton used." In his opinion "120 workpeople in Oldham could do what 750 workers did in Bombay ". Along with all the other Lancashire witnesses Fielden stressed the favourable location factors enjoyed by the Indian spinners particularly their close proximity to raw cotton supplies ; " for the Lancashire spinner **, Fielden maintained, " there is the additional cost of transporting the cotton from Liverpool and putting it down in Oldham, whereas the Indian spinner merely takes the raw cotton from the Bombay market to the Bombay mill. There is then the extra cost of transporting spun yarn from Oldham to Bombay before it is even in a state to compete with Indian spun yarns. It costs at least 1.06d. per Ib. of yarn in transport charges before the yarn is ready to be sold in Bombay; by comparison, at an outside estimate, the Indian spinners have paid %d. per Ib. in transport charges."
Fielden also supplied details of costings taken from a Middleton spinning firm, spinning up to 20's coarse yarns from the lowest grades of Indian cotton.
There was nothing in the first two clauses of the Final Report with which one might quarrel seriously; additions could have been made to account for the loss of trade by the Lancashire merchants and manufacturers,1 but only the essential facts and few private opinions had yet been quoted. The third clause in the Report was rather different. It contained the two opposing views within the Chamber, of the place accorded to monetary factors in accounting for the decline of Lancashire's trade with Asia.
George Lord and a majority of the Chamber directors maintained that the recent changes in the relative value of silver had had little or no direct effect upon Asiatic marketing conditions ; in their view, " the main items in the working of mills such as machinery, cotton and coals are unaffected by a fall in the gold value of the rupee, but wages and local taxation are not immediately affected and until an adjustment takes place, the Indian spinner is at an advantage. This advantage is so small by comparison with those included under Clauses I and 11 as to be almost negligible."
Elijah Helm, the Secretary of the Chamber, and a few other directors, opposed the majority view. For them the fall in silver values " gave the Lancashire spinner a reduced sterling price for his yarn through the conversion of dollars into English money at a lower rate of exchange, whilst his competitor in Bombay escaped all loss from this source. The fixed capital costs in mill production do not suffer but the labour costs, taxation, insurance, etc., all count. The latter are the advantages which Bombay secures over Lancashire."
Chamber members were irrevocably divided on this issue and as a result, both sets of arguments appear side by side in the 1 The Economist (30 July 1888), for instance, commented in their review of the Chamber's Report that: "the leading cause of the Chinese decline in handling English yarns is that Bombay spinnings resemble Chinese yarns. English mill-managers, having just returned from the East, claim that Indian yarn is rougher than the Oldham, Wigan, or Rochdale qualities. It is softer spun and the fibres of the yarn stand out: the truth is that they produce the yarn to suit the requirements of the customer and Lancashire employers ought to do the same."
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Final Report. Its eventual publication provoked a storm of protest from the Bombay millowners. A special Association meeting of the Bombay millowners was called to consider official counter measures " against the philanthropic endeavours of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to hamper the staple industry of Bombay ". Sir Dinshaw Manockjee Petit, Chairman of the Association, opened the proceedings and '* gave it as his own experience that the factory hands of Bombay were, if not more healthy, at least quite as healthy as other individuals of their class who are not mill labourers ". Mr. Cotton, another Bombay millowner, criticized Manchester's suggestion in the Chamber Report that the Indian cotton operatives should return to agricultural employment and grow cotton for Manchester. " It would also be pleasant ", he commented, " to see Bombay as a depot for Eastern products and Western manufactures; no doubt it would, for Manchester but what of Bombay? There is room in world markets for both Indian and Lancashire textile producers; we cannot compete with Lancashire on the finer counts, but she cannot come near us on the others."1
The speeches continued and enthusiasm ran high, one Bombay millowner later remarking that " Manchester has resorted to the war of the knife ". But nothing more dramatic than a strong protest against the sinister intentions of the Manchester Chamber was finally registered by the meeting.
Although a majority of the cotton businessmen were prepared to exhort foreign governments to maintain free trading fiscal policies, rarely, if at all before 1914, did they propose any form of physical retaliation against the goods from those countries where protective policies prevailed.
That is not to say that the activities of the Chamber remained unaffected by the growing demand for Tariff Reform in the rest of the United Kingdom during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There was no more important centre of British industry desired by the Protectionists than the citadel of free trade in Manchester. With this end in view a branch of the National Fair Trade League had been founded in Manchester during 1886 by two local businessmen, Hibbert and Rigg. The former was a member of the Manchester Chamber as well as being Mayor of Chorley, whilst Rigg was a partner in Rigg Brothers at that time a small cotton spinning and manufacturing firm in Bury, Lancashire.1 The fair trade assault on the Chamber developed quickly, with Hibbert playing a leading hand. In May 18862 a Resolution expressing " the unswerving confidence of the Manchester Chamber in the principles of free trade " and condemning " the movement in favour of a policy of retaliation against Protectionist countries " was carried by a majority of only two votes with six abstentions. At the following Quarterly meeting,3 the motion " that having waited in vain more than forty years for other nations to follow England's free trade example, this Chamber thinks the time has now arrived to reconsider its position " was lost by only two votes. Even admitting that the whole body of the Chamber membership was not present at this or the previous meeting, it cannot be denied that the fair trade challenge had by this stage begun to assume important proportions.
The fair traders' assault continued during the following year with proposals to impose " moderate tariffs for revenue purposes on all manufactured articles from countries competing with our own industries, with a corresponding reduction of the burdens which bear so heavily upon the mercantile community at home"; and " the abolition of all duties upon tea, coffee, cocoa, chicory, and dried fruits, and the imposition of revenue duties of an equal value upon wheat, barley, oats, rye, beans, etc., from protected countries ".
Both proposals were heavily defeated and the Chamber went on to " re-affirm its unabated confidence in the principles of free trade ". But the Manchester free traders were not satisfied merely to re-affirm their free trading principles, they went on to suggest alternative means of overcoming the increased competitive conditions for the sale of their goods in the World markets. They returned to the mid-century Cobdenite formula of expanding the quantity level of final market demand by suggesting the increased development of the World's economically backward lands.1 It meant " urging upon her Majesty's Government to foster by every possible means the systematic creation of new markets by enabling such part of our annual surplus population of over 350,000 souls, for whom our industries fail to find employment, to be drafted into Canada, Australia and South Africa on rational self supporting principles, thereby doubling the present purchasing power of these Colonies every five to ten years and drawing them into closer union with the Mother Country ".2
The need for increased population and development of the Colonial Territories impressed many other cotton trade organizations 3 beside the Manchester Chamber as one possible means of remedying the depressed condition of the cotton trade in the late nineteenth century.
The Chamber Protectionists found themselves momentarily in the majority of those present at a Quarterly Meeting held in December 1888, and they secured the passage of a Resolution which suggested " that goods imported into the United Kingdom should pay an equal and proportionate share of taxation, which they would have paid, had the goods been produced or manufactured in the United Kingdom 'V Immediately the resolution voting figures were announced, those free traders who were present rose and walked out of the Chamber.
The news of this sudden weakening in Manchester's support for free trade produced a sensational reaction from the rest of the country, but William Fogg one of the Chamber directors disclosed the true facts of the situation in a letter to The Times on the following day. 2 According to this account, only eighty members of the total Chamber membership of 1,000 were present at the meeting, whilst he named in his letter the activities of a paid Fair Trade League lecturer who had been sponsoring this continual agitation in the Manchester Chamber.
Only a fortnight after the resolution supporting a return to protection had been accepted by the Chamber, the directors circularized all members with a specially arranged postal proxy vote. In the replies nearly eight hundred of the most influential and most successful Lancashire cotton businessmen declared their " unfaltering adherence to the principles of free trade, so often affirmed by this Chamber ", and resolved further, " that the Protectionist Resolution did not represent the views of the Chamber as a whole ". Even though the resolution was carried by a large majority, 221 Chamber members voted against it which was certainly a significant pointer to the growth in strength of the protectionist cause in Lancashire.
After this sharp reverse for the protectionists, and with the betterment of trading conditions for the cotton industry during 1889 and 1890, the free trade-protectionist battle in the Chamber abated temporarily and permitted other subjects to steal the attentions of the Chamber directors. But at the Quarterly General Meeting in April 189 1 3 the struggle was resumed again when the protectionists proposed that : " this Chamber is of the opinion that the time has arrived for imposing import duties 24 December 1888.
2 The Times, 26 December 1888. 8 P.M.C.C. 27 April 1891. It was only possible for the protectionists to include these resolutions, urging the overthrow of free trade, on the agenda for discussion at the Quarterly or Annual Meetings of the Chamber, for none of their members was a Chamber director, and, therefore, they could not propose a special meeting of the Chamber to discuss the question. upon all competing labour products coupled with commercial union with our Colonies and Possessions, by means of preferential import duties and so enlarging the circle of exchange and securing approximate free trade within the limits of the British Empire." On this occasion there were only thirteen members willing to support the resolution, with four times their number in opposition.
The Chamber Quarterly Meeting in July the following year produced yet another protectionist resolution * ; it pointed out " that our fiscal policy of admitting at our ports free from taxation, competing food products and manufactured goods from countries where they cost the least in wages, is injurious to our wage earners and the industrial interests of Great Britain and Ireland ". Once more the motion was lost, again by a heavy majority.
So far as the nineteenth century is concerned this proved the last of the protectionist resolutions debated by the Manchester Chamber, but there were to be many more in later years.
VI
It would be only correct to conclude from these incidents that at the end of the nineteenth century the majority of the Lancashire cotton business community still remained firm in its support of a free trade fiscal policy. The numerous resolutions which appeared before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce urging an immediate return to fiscal protection would be more correctly interpreted as the product of a deliberate and skilful campaign organized by the supporters of the National Fair Trade League within the Manchester Chamber, rather than as a spontaneous true revolt of Lancashire business against the principles of free trade. In fact, free trade had been the vogue for so long and whilst the prices of Lancashire cottons remained competitive in international markets the majority of Lancashire producers neither desired nor proved capable of shaking themselves free from thinking in the old terms.
.M.CC 25 July 1892.
